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Toxic Compensation Bills
by Robert C. Anderson*
Congress has demonstrated interest in toxic compensation legislation, but not enough agreement to
make significant progress. Advocates of reform claim that the legal system is heavily weighed against
victims who seek compensation through the courts. Proposed reforms include a compensation fund and
acauseofaction infederal court. Criticshavequestionedwhetherthese changes inthe lawwouldrepresent
an improvement. Existing income replacement, medical cost reimbursement, and survivor insurance pro-
grams largely cover the losses of individuals with chronic disease. Thus, the need for an additional
compensation is not clear. Furthermore, experience with compensation funds such as the Black Lung
Fund suggests that political rather than scientific criteria may be used to determine eligibility. Finally,
under the proposed financing mechanisms the compensation funds that are being debated would not
increase incentives for care in the handling of hazardous wastes or toxic substances.
Introduction
During the past five years, various legislative pro-
posals have surfaced in Congress that would substan-
tially alter the procedures under which individuals are
compensated for harms from toxic substances. Four re-
cent proposals are of particular interest.
Congressman Miller has introduced legislation
(H.R.3175) that would create a compensation fund for
personal injuries attributed to occupational exposure to
asbestos. SenatorStafford hasproposed acompensation
fund (S.517) for personal injuries resulting from envi-
ronmental exposures to hazardous substances. This fund
wouldbecoupledwith a causeofactioninfederalcourts.
Of three proposals by Congressman Florio, one
(H.R.4813) is broadly similar in structure to that ad-
vocated by Senator Stafford, and a second (H.R.5640)
drops the compensation fund while retaining other key
features.
A basic issue one immediately confronts with respect
to compensation is illustrated in the following example.
Suppose a large group of individuals is exposed to a
hazardous substance and that this exposure is corre-
lated with an increase in the incidence of a chronic dis-
ease from a background level of 100 cases over the
individuals' lifetime to 110 cases, 10 cases more than
would have been expected in an unexposed group this
size. Further, suppose there is no scientific technique
that permits one to determine which 10 ofthe 110 cases
resulted from the exposure in question. The issue is
whether a social purpose is served by the payment of
compensation tied tothese harms. Should compensation
be paid to all, some, or none of these individuals? If
compensationistobepaid, howlarge shoulditbe? What
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administrative or legal mechanism should be used to
effect compensation?
Some of the issues that should be addressed in eval-
uating proposals for new compensation legislation in-
clude: (1) do existing income replacement and medical
care programs, includingtort actions, provide sufficient
compensation to individuals who have a chronic illness
that may have originated with exposure to hazardous
substances, and (2) are incentives for due care by those
who generate, transport or dispose of hazardous sub-
stances now adequate?
Background
The current congressional debate over toxic compen-
sation has its roots in the legislation that created the
"Superfund" for the cleanup of toxic waste dumps. At
the time the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (P.L.96-510)
was enacted, Congress considered but rejected various
proposals to include personal injury compensation within
the scope ofthatlegislation. Ultimately, personalinjury
compensation was not included due to uncertainty over
the need for such a provision and pragmatic consider-
ations related to passingthelegislation. To help resolve
the issue of need regarding personal injury compensa-
tion, Section 301(e) of CERCLA called for a report to
Congress on the adequacy of existing legal remedies
and recommendations for improvements in the law.
On July 30, 1983 the 301(e) Study Group submitted
to Congress its analysis of existing remedies (1). In-
cluded was a recommendation for a two-tier system of
remedies for personal injuries and damages caused by
the release of hazardous substances from waste sites.
The Study Group's "Tier I" proposal would represent a
significant changeinexistingcompensation systems. In-R. C. ANDERSON
jured persons would have the option of pursuing an
administrative fund remedy similar to that available
under existing workers' compensation systems and the
black lung program. The proposed Tier I remedy was
intended by the Study Group to provide a speedy and
effective means ofcompensating persons injured by (1)
releases covered by CERCLA, i.e., from old hazardous
waste sites, and (2) releases caused by failures in RCRA's
cradle to grave containment of currently-generated
wastes. Compensation would be made for medical costs
and lost earnings (up to $2,000 per month) as well as
death benefits. Compensation for pain and suffering,
property damages and punitive damages would not be
made under the Tier I remedy but would be available
should an individual prevail in a tort action under Tier
II.
Access to Tier I remedies would be based on stan-
dards of proof much relaxed from traditional tort lia-
bility. Tort actions regarding toxic waste injuries
generally require that the plaintiff (1) identify a party
who is responsible, (2) prove that the substance caused
an injury, and (3) show that the conduct ofthe respon-
sible party did not meet a common law standard ofcare
or that the activity was so hazardous that it should be
governed by rules of strict liability. Under the Tier I
recommendation, claimants would not need to identify
the party or parties responsible for a release of a haz-
ardous waste. The compensation fund would have the
right of subrogation against responsible parties for re-
leases that occurred after the creation of the Tier I
remedy. This right of subrogation would give the fund
allofthe legalrights formerly heldbytheclaimant; thus
the fund could consolidate cases relating to a single re-
lease and seek reimbursement of its compensation ex-
penditures from aresponsible party. To the extent fund
expenses are reimbursed, incentives for care are given
to waste generators and disposal firms (2).
With respect to proving that an exposure to a toxic
substance caused an injury, the Study Group recom-
mended that the federal administrator of the Tier I
system develop and issue Toxic Substance Documents
thatreview andanalyzethe health dangersfromspecific
substances-much like criteria documents currently de-
veloped under the Clean Air Act. Because of scientific
uncertainty concerning the relationships between ex-
posure to hazardous substances and specific diseases,
the Study Group advocated the use of presumptions
regarding causation. Specifically, if the claimant could
establisn exposure to a hazardous waste and an injury
ordisease that is scientifically linked to such exposures,
arebuttable presumption would be established that the
claimant's harm was caused by that exposure.
Finally, the claimant would be relieved of the need
to establish that a defendant's conduct was improper.
Traditional theories oftort liability such as negligence,
nuisance and trespass all involve an assessment of the
conduct of the defendant in a particular circumstance.
Violation of a standard of care under one of these the-
ories subjects the defendant to liability whereas adher-
ence to a standard ofcare may bar or limit recovery by
the plaintiff. The proposed Tier I remedy would elim-
inate breaches of a standard of care by the defendant
as prerequisites for compensation of a claimant.
The Tier I proposal of the 301(e) Study Group has
been criticized from several perspectives. Substituting
loosely worded presumptions for traditional tort law
requirements that a claimant demonstrate exposure,
causation, and breach of a standard of care by a de-
fendant radically alters a claimant's prospects for re-
covery. Althoughbestscientific evidenceisthatperhaps
5% of cancers are of occupational origin and an addi-
tional 2 or 3% ofenvironmental origin (3), critics ofthe
Study Group proposals point out that nearly the entire
U.S. population has some, albeit low, exposure to can-
cer-causingtoxic substances. With liberalpresumptions
regarding causation, a large fraction of cancer victims
and others with chronic disease could make a successful
claim against the Tier I fund.
To return briefly to the hypothetical example posed
at the outset ofthis paper, the Study Group Tier I fund
remedy would appear to deem as compensable all 110
cases-the background 100 cases as well as the 10 ad-
ditional cases that could be attributed statistically to
toxic substances.
In addition to the Tier I remedy, the Study Group
advocated a "Tier II" cause ofaction in state courts and
the reform of state law. Few states at present provide
a specific cause of action for those with injuries from
hazardous wastes ortoxic substances. The StudyGroup
asserted that while state common law does provide a
cause ofaction in all states, it is heavily stacked against
avictiminthese cases. Thus furtherbroadening ofstate
causes of action is needed.
Critics have pointed out that the combined Tier I and
Tier II remedies further shift the balance toward over
compensation ofindividuals with chronic disease. Mon-
ies obtained under Tier I could be used to finance a
lawsuit under Tier II, giving individuals with chronic
disease two opportunities to collect compensation for
their disease. Iftoxic substances and hazardous wastes
were causing large numbers of chronic illnesses such a
compensation schememightbewarranted, but, asnoted
earlier, scientific evidence suggests otherwise. Conse-
quently, critics charge that the combined Tier I and
Tier II remedies amount to nothing short of national
health insurance for all victims of chronic disease cast,
however, in the politically appealing guise of an attack
on the irresponsible generation and disposal ofhazard-
ous wastes.
Manyofthe basic proposals ofthe301(e) StudyGroup
havebeenincorporatedintothetoxiccompensationbills
now before Congress. In evaluating these proposals, it
is essential to review the existing structure ofcompen-
sation mechanisms. Two perspectives are particularly
important. First, how broad is the coverage in terms
of compensating deserving individuals and second, are
incentives for care incorporated in the mechanism that
finances compensation? We willturn to thefirstofthese
issues initially.
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A Review of Existing Compensation
Mechanisms
In assessing the need for and desirability of changes
in the mechanisms that compensate individuals with
chronic illness, an important consideration is the depth
and breadth of coverage under existing compensation
programs. A review of existing compensation mecha-
nisms should help to determine (1) if there are large
numbers of people whose losses presently go uncom-
pensated by existing mechanisms, and (2) the extent of
coverage in terms of the percentage of the loss that is
replaced. This review is intended to look at the com-
pensation mechanisms as they potentially would be
available to anyone in the U.S. with a chronic illness.
The question of how many of such illnesses might be
caused by toxic substance exposure is not considered.
At the outset, one may note that compensation can
take two forms: as a payment for bearing risk that pre-
cedes any injury and as a payment to an individual who
incurs a loss. This review focuses on the second form
of compensation-payments made after a loss has
occurred.
Economic losses by individuals with chronic illnesses
may be categorized as follows: lost income while the
individuallives, medical expenses, lostincomefrom pre-
mature death, pain and suffering, and loss of nonwage
contributions tothefamilyandsociety. Themostrecent,
relatively complete information on the extent to which
individuals disabled by chronic illnesses are recovering
their lost income (4), suggested that approximately 40%
ofthe pre-tax income lost by those severely disabled by
occupational disease was replaced. The percentage of
workers with various sources ofsupport included: social
security, 53%; private pensions, 21%; veterans benefits,
17%; welfare, 16%; workers' compensation, 5%; and pri-
vate insurance, 1%. Tort actions compensated less than
1%. In this sample, 45% of those severely disabled by
occupational disease received support from a single
source; 29% received support from two sources, and 5%
received support fromthree or more sources. Some 22%
received no form ofincome replacement. Social security
provided not only the broadest coverage but it also was
increasing rapidly during the period in which the data
were collected (1974). Thus, coverage today is likely to
be broader than it was at the time of the survey.
In terms of the number of people covered, private
insurance is the dominant mechanism for meeting the
medical expenses associated with chronic illness. Pres-
ently approximately 80% of the population has some
form of private hospitalization insurance and over 65%
of the population has private insurance coverage for
major medical expenses. Public medical care under
Medicare, Medicaid and veterans' programs now pro-
vides higher total dollar payments than do private in-
surers. In 1982Medicarepaid some$51 billion, Medicaid
$30 billion, and private insurance approximately $65
billion in medical benefits.
Private insurance and the social security survivors
program are the principal sources of compensation in
the case of death. In 1982, death benefits of approxi-
mately $15 billion were paid by life insurers. Under the
survivors insurance component of social security, ap-
proximately $29 billion was paid in 1982 to widows,
widowers and survivingchildrenofdeceasedindividuals
covered by social security.
Incentive Effects
In terms ofthe dollar amounts paid in compensation,
tort actions pale in significance relative to other private
and public programs. For example, inrecentyears, less
than $1 billion per year is awarded by the courts to
plaintiffs alleging harms due to toxic or hazardous sub-
stance exposure. However, tort actions are very im-
portant from another perspective-that of providing
incentives for care. Whereas public compensation and
private insurance programs are financed through charges
levied prospectively onalarge group ofindividuals, tort
liability is retrospective in its assessment of charges.
Public compensation and private insurance spread risks
but tort liability focuses the costs of harm on those
determined to be at fault by the court. Therefore, though
it appears that existing compensation mechanisms pro-
vide reasonably complete coverage forpotential victims
ofhazardous waste or toxic substance exposure, an as-
sessment of compensation through tort actions is also
important from the perspective of incentives for care.
Under state commonlaw, aplaintiffmayhave a cause
ofaction for personal injury and property damage once
injuries have occurred. Four cases of action are poten-
tially available for environmental exposures: negli-
gence, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability. With the
exception of some forms ofstrict liability, these causes
of action center on the conduct of the defendant. For
any of these causes of action, a plaintiff must demon-
strate by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the
defendant made, disposed of, or was otherwise respon-
sible for the substance in question, and (2) that the
plaintiff suffered a harm from exposure to the sub-
stance. A plaintiff may encounter additional obstacles
to litigation, includingthe costs ofpursuing such a suit,
immunity for the government, and restrictive statutes
of limitation.
Identifying the Defendant
With few exceptions, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant made, sold, or disposed of the product that
caused the injury. When injuries are discovered only
after several years have elapsed, courts have relaxed
this burden ofproofin some instances. Five theories of
liability have been used in lieu ofproofofidentification
of the defendant.
The theory of "alternate liability" shifts the burden
ofproofto the defendants to provethey should not bear
the liability. This theory was used in Summers v. Tice
(5), where the plaintiff was unable to prove which of
two hunters fired the birdshot that caused injury to his
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eye. Some courts have adopted "expanded alternate li-
ability" so that a plaintiff need not sue all potentially
liable parties and that defendants need not be better
able than the plaintiff to offer evidence as to the cause
of harm. Most courts, however, have rejected "ex-
panded alternate liability."
"Concert ofaction" is a second theory plaintiffs have
used when the identity of the source of harm is not
certain. Traditionally, this theory was used when de-
fendants acted according to a joint scheme in causing
harm to another party. In the DES case, Bichler v. Eli
Lilly (6), the court upheld liability under a concert of
action because the defendant drug manufacturer was
found to have engaged in parallel testing and marketing
practices with others in the industry and because they
encouraged other manufacturers to do inadequate test-
ing. Most courts, though, have rejected the concert of
action theory in DES cases.
A third theory of expanded liability is termed "in-
dustrywide liability" or "enterprise liability." This the-
ory shares features ofthe first two theories. The plaintiff
can recover damages when it can be shown that the
identity ofthe specific manufacturer is unknown to him
and that all manufacturers in the industry controlled
industry standards and therefore the risks to product
users. This theory has never been applied successfully
to a DES case, perhaps because of the larger number
of manufacturers. The theory has been accepted for
industries where adominant firminitially controlled the
marketing, e.g., blasting caps.
The fourth theory, "market share liability," arose in
the decision ofthe DES case Sindell v. Abbott Labs (7).
Under market share liability, defendants may be held
liable for a portion ofthe damages based on the market
sharetheyheld. Marketshareliabilityhasbeenaffirmed
in New Jersey courts (8) and in Texas (9), but rejected
in other state courts, including those ofGeorgia, South
Carolina, and Florida.
A recent Wisconsin case, Collins v. Eli Lilly (10),
provides a fifth theory ofliability. After describing the
four previously enunciated theories, the court created
a new rationale: each defendant contributed to the risk
to the public. Moreover, the plaintiff could suejust one
defendant; that defendant must thenjoin other defend-
ants in the case in orderto escape fullliability. Liability
would be apportioned among the defendants according
to several considerations, including their knowledge of
theriskatthetimeofmanufacture, warningstheyused,
testing, and market share.
Causation
Under a specific cause of action or under state com-
mon law, aplaintiffultimately will have to demonstrate
exposure to hazardous substances and a causal connec-
tion between that exposure and the plaintiffs injury.
The relevance ofquantitative scientific data to hazard-
ous substance lawsuits is obvious. Whether such evi-
dence will be deemed admissible in the courtroom is
problematic. Despitetheapparentrelevanceofthistype
of data, its use is controversial in some jurisdictions.
Several explanations may be offered. One factor which
runs through many legal precedents is a distrust ofsta-
tistical evidence. Animal studies may be viewed as ir-
relevant to issues of causation in humans. Statistical
evidence also is subject to many interpretations. Fi-
nally, statistical evidence may be excluded if sample
sizeswere small, controlswere notusedforconfounding
variables, or the results are otherwise subject to ques-
tion. Almost all of these criticisms would apply to any
study of human health effects from hazardous sub-
stances, particularly a localized incident such as a spill
or a leaking waste disposal site.
The usual standard of proof of causation required in
tort is termed "preponderance ofthe evidence." This is
normally interpreted to mean that the probability of
causation was more likely than not, i.e., the probability
that the harm was caused by the defendant is greater
than 50%.
Many chronic diseases have multiple causes-for ex-
ample, cancer at certain sites may be caused by toxic
agents as well as diet, smoking, and diagnostic radia-
tion. A problem with tort actions, both as a compen-
sation device and as amechanism forprovidingincentives
forgreatercare is thatonlyrarelywould asingle source
of the several that may be implicated pass the 50%
probability threshold. Thus, toxic agents could produce
large numbers of low-level risks of chronic disease to
individuals and yet not meet the legal definition ofcaus-
ation in any ofthe cases that might result. Collectively,
small risks of disease to many individuals imply that
someindividualswillcontractthosediseases. Thatthose
individuals cannot be distinguished from individuals who
contracted the disease from other sources such as diet
and lifestyle maybe reason enough thatthey go uncom-
pensated by the tort system. However, if no compen-
sation is paid for such harms, the correct incentives will
not exist for due care and risk avoidance.
Other Burdens on the Plaintiff
Several other features of tort litigation over toxic
substance exposure deserve mention. One is the cost to
plaintiffs ofmarshalling the evidence necessary to pur-
sue a lawsuit. Extensive literature reviews and scien-
tific studies are needed; even if the plaintiff is lucky
enough to have EPAintervention overawaste site that
identifies the responsible parties and the toxic sub-
stance, medical evidence on disease causation must still
be produced. Good scientific studies are expensive.
However, class action or mass torts could facilitate the
pooling of resources by groups of individuals in order
to acquire needed scientific information.
Legalfees are anotherconstraint onaccess tothe tort
system. In testimony before Congress, George Free-
man has noted that plaintiffs attorneys are seldomwill-
ing to take cases on a contingent fee basis unless the
claim exceeds $75,000. Plaintiffs may have difficulty
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finding counsel for smaller claims (1). Furthermore,
studies of the costs experienced by asbestos litigants
show that legal expenses may absorb two-thirds ofthe
financial outlay by the defendant (11).
Anotherbarrierinhazardous substance tortlitigation
occurs when the responsible party is immune from lit-
igation. Ifthe federal government owns a site, victims
may be barred from recovery because of sovereign im-
munity. Barriers to private action also occur when the
operator ofa waste facility has declared bankruptcy or
is financially unable to pay compensation. Finally, in a
few states victims may be barred by a harsh statute of
limitations thatbars tort actions more thantwo orthree
yearsfollowingthe date oflastexposure. While statutes
of limitations for long-latency diseases are being tem-
pered by using discovery of the disease rather than
exposuretodeterminethe statutoryperiod, victims still
face the challenge of amassing evidence for harms that
may have occurred 20 years or more previously.
This review ofthe legal remedies currently available
for injuries and damages from hazardous wastes has
shown that those who- are injured sometimes face nu-
merous barriers to recovery in our legal system. How-
ever, the common law is evolving rapidly, especially in
the area of apportioning liability and in adopting a re-
laxed rule for applying the statute of limitations for
filing suits. At present 39 courts use the date of dis-
covery rule in setting the statute of limitations.
A computer search oftoxics-related litigation in 1974
produced only two examples: the 1973 Borel asbestos
decisionand a 1967silicosis case. Nowthousands ofsuch
cases are being filed annually. Approximately 25,000
asbestos cases have been ified; more than 1000 involve
DES, several hundred involve formaldehyde, and oth-
ers concern exposure to benzene, Agent Orange, var-
ious drugs, and other chemicals (12). Though still
relatively uncommon, a number ofcases have been filed
for alleged health effects from drinking water contam-
inated by hazardous wastes. Thus, an argument could
be made that as the common law evolves some of the
barriers noted by the 301(e) Study Group will fade in
importance.
The one key advantage oftort liability is thatjudicial
verdicts provide a direct economic incentive for firms
and individuals who produce, transport and dispose of
hazardous substances to engage in appropriate levels of
care to minimize liability from tort actions. Because of
these economic incentives, it may be important to pre-
serve or enhance opportunities for tort actions regard-
ing personal injury from exposure to hazardous
substances. However, a factor that may dilute incen-
tives is that personal injuries due to hazardous sub-
stances, especially those originating from environmental
exposures, typically become apparent only after long
delays. These lags may reduce significantly the incen-
tive effect one would.otherwise observe if events and
responses were contemporaneous. For example, if a
waste generator faces potential liability 20 years hence,
each dollar ofthat liability would be only a few pennies
today at conventional (market) rates ofdiscount. More-
over, future liability is capped by the magnitude of a
corporation's net assets at that future date because a
firm always has the option of going bankrupt and es-
caping further costs when liabilities exceed assets.
The incentive effects that could be produced through
existing tort liability or through tort law reform do not
appear to have been a major consideration ofeither the
301(e) Study Group or the drafters of toxic compensa-
tion bills now before Congress. Indeed, under these
proposals, compensation funds would be financed by a
broad tax on chemicals and petrochemical feedstocks,
in certain cases to be augmented by a tax on waste
disposal. Taxes paid to finance the fund would produce
negligible incentives for care. However, the federal cause
ofaction and the rights ofthe fund managers to litigate
to recover for payments to victims could produce in-
centives. Whether these incentives would be appropri-
ate in magnitude to induce due care has not been
analyzed, either by the drafters of the proposed legis-
lation or by various commentators.
Evaluating Alternative Remedies
This country has had considerable experience with
fund mechanisms for compensating personal injuries.
The Black Lung Fund and other federal fund programs
share several features of the proposed Tier I compen-
sation fund. U.S. experience with the Black Lung Fund
highlights akeydifficultywithfunds, namely, thatpres-
sures are brought through the political process to
broaden coverage to include nonmeritorious cases.
Coal dust inhalation has long been known to cause
respiratory disability among miners, particularly in un-
derground mines. Despite considerable medical evi-
dence as to the occupational nature ofcoalminers' black
lung, affectedminerswere largelyunabletoobtaincom-
pensation through state workers' compensation. The first
major reform in compensation for this occupational dis-
ability came as part of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969. At that time, the federal gov-
ernment assumed responsiblity formakingpayments to
workers who were totally disabled from the disease.
Futurecompensationcostswereestimated tototalsome
$350 million.
In the original 1969 legislation, payments to disabled
miners were to be made by the government for only
four years. After that date, claims were to be assigned
to prior employers for payment. Assigning liability to
responsible parties was found to be much more difficult
than expected, however, leading to the eventual crea-
tion ofanindustry-financed fundtocompensate disabled
miners. Financing for the fund came principally from a
two-tier tax on production: intitially $0.50 per ton on
underground coal and $0.25 on surface coal, subse-
quently raised to $1 and $0.50 per ton, respectively.
This funding mechanism provides no direct financial in-
centive to operators to avoid dust exposures by their
employees.
During the 1970s, Congress and the agencies respon-
sible for administering the program (first the Social Se-
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curity Administration and later the Department of
Labor) came under repeated pressure to liberalize the
program so that more miners could receive benefits.
Although benefit levels on an individual basis remain
modest by almost any standard, the number ofminers
qualifying for benefits under greatly relaxed standards
of eligibility rapidly grew to encompass well over half
of all individuals with more than 10 years of mine em-
ployment. Despite recent tightening ofeligibility stan-
dards, total programoutlays exceeded$15billionbythe
end of1983, ormorethan40timesthe originalestimate.
As proposed in recent legislative initiatives, the Tier
I fund remedy would be financed by a set of uniform
taxesonchemicalandpetroleumfeedstocksandperhaps
be supplemented by a set of taxes on the disposal of
hazardous wastes. A rebuttable presumption would be
made infavorofclaimants who could establish exposure
to hazardous substances and an injury or disease that
is believed in the scientific community to result from
suchexposures. Unlessthis presumptionwererebutted
successfully by a party or parties who caused the ex-
posure, the claimant would be paid from the industry-
financed Tier I fund.
Under the proposals ofCongressman Florio and Sen-
ator Stafford, the federal agency charged with admin-
istering the fund would develop a series of scientific
background documents ontherelationshipsbetweenex-
posure to hazardous substances and the risks of con-
tracting various diseases. Material considered relevant
to causation would include animal experiments, tissue
cultures, epidemiology, and mutagenicity tests.
One unknown in these proposals is how the issue of
causation would be handled in these documents and by
the administering agency for particular diseases, sub-
stances, and exposed populations. Would the agency
establish criteria so that only injuries and illnesses hav-
ing a probability greater than 50% ofhaving originated
with exposure to hazardous substances would be com-
pensated? Would some other threshold be used, ifonly
implicitly? What role would animal tests play? If the
experience ofthe Black Lung Fund is a guide, pressure
to liberalize criteria will be brought by individuals who
have illnesses or diseases that could have originated
with hazardous substances but whose cases do not pass
the causation threshold imposed by the administering
agency. These pressures eventually could result in pre-
sumptions infavorofcases where hazardous substances
have only a minimal probability of having caused the
injuries or diseases of a group of claimants.
It would appear that toxic compensation funds do not
merit further serious consideration as a compensation
mechanism. Such fundswould lacktheabilitytoprovide
desirable incentive effects, would largely duplicate cov-
erage already available under current programs, and
would create a program that would be subject to the
same pressures that led to the virtually uncontrolled
expansion ofthe Black Lung Fund.
This review of tort liability observed that incentive
effects are a distinct positive attribute. Indeed, several
recent reform proposals are directed at strengthening
these incentives.
One step that has been advocated toimprove existing
remedies is to change some ofthe evidentiary require-
ments oftort actions. In particular, the burden ofiden-
tifying the defendant and proving to a legal standard
that the substance released by the defendant caused
harmtotheplaintiffcouldbothbemodified toastandard
of proportional liability. To be sure many courts have
already done this with respect to the burden of iden-
tifying the defendant. Liability in proportion to the
probability of causation would appear to increase effi-
ciency; tort awards would be more closely matched to
the best estimate of loss rather than the current all or
nothing outcome in court (13). To return once again to
the hypothetical situation posed at the outset of this
paper, proportional liability might compensate all 110
cases but only for the excess over background levels.
That is, each individual would receive 10/110 share of
an award.
Conclusion
The 301(e) Study Group report has identified several
features of the tort system that may render it unat-
tractive as a compensation device for those harmed by
exposure to toxic substances and hazardous wastes. As
supplements to the tort system, the Study Group pro-
posed a Tier I compensation fund and a Tier II cause
of action in state court. Two of the bills now before
Congress adopt the fund proposal but replace the Tier
II remedy with a cause ofaction in federal court. Other
proposals dispense with the fund but maintainthe cause
of action in federal court.
Whetherthe two-tiered remedy proposed by the Study
Group or the bills now before Congress represent an
improvement over existing compensation mechanisms
is doubtful. There is a great likelihood that Congress
would respond to political pressures rather than best
scientificevidenceresultinginthecompensationoflarge
numbers of cases of dubious merit. Moreover, existing
programs already may provide sufficient dollar payouts
to individuals who have chronic disease.
If the incentive effects of a compensation program
are deemed important, alternative reforms of the tort
system might be a more logical step to take. One pro-
posal has advocated the incorporation of proportional
liability into tort law; however, the feasibility ofimple-
menting this potentially interesting proposal has yet to
be evaluated.
The views contained herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of API or any of its members.
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